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The elasticity of taxable income has gained increasing attention as a ﬁscal policy
parameter. This paper provides empirical evidence for Germany and adds to the
relatively small body of literature for European countries. We use a large new
panel data set to analyze the taxable income response to tax rate changes in 2004
which were part of an extensive reform programme in Germany at the beginning
of this century. We ﬁnd an average elasticity of approximately 0.6. Separately
estimated income eﬀects however are mostly small or insigniﬁcant. The results
vary when dividing taxpayers by income type and group.
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During the last decade the elasticity of taxable income has gained increasing at-
tention as a ﬁscal policy parameter. It captures all behavioral responses by which
taxpayers strive to reduce their individual tax burden such as increasing the con-
sumption of tax-deductible goods, shifting between diﬀerent types of income, or
even evading the tax to some extent. It is thus considered a more comprising ref-
erence for calculating the eﬃciency costs of income taxation than the labor supply
elasticity alone.
Since Feldstein’s (1995) seminal paper, data availability has considerably im-
proved and a growing body of empirical literature has emerged. Saez/Slemrod/
Giertz (2009) give a critical review of the relevant work. The further development
of Feldstein’s methodological approach, especially the inclusion of income controls,
has in general led to considerably lower estimates. Nevertheless the range of results
is still rather wide depending on which data set has been used, which reform has
been examined and how non-tax related income trends have been controlled for.
The majority of empirical studies is based on income tax return data in the United
States, only several studies examine taxpayer behavior in non-US countries, for ex-
ample Canada (Sillamaa/Veall (2001)) or Scandinavia (Aarbu/Thoresen (2001),
Hansson (2007)). In Germany, hardly any empirical evidence has been provided so
far, except for Gottfried/Schellhorn (2004) who analyze data from a south-western
region.
This paper contributes to the literature with elasticity estimates for Germany.
We use a new panel data set of individual tax returns that is currently available for
the years 2001–2004 and contains very detailed information on income, deductions
and allowances. The balanced panel includes all German taxpayers that could be
linked over time (approximately 20 million cases) and thus oﬀers an outstanding
data base. Moreover, during the years 2001–2005 a major income tax reform took
place in Germany which provides the exogenous tax rate change we exploited in
our analysis. The reform itself was designed to perceptibly reduce the tax burden
with particular emphasis on low- and middle-income families, employees and small
and medium private partnerships.
1The empirical approach in this paper follows in large parts the existing litera-
ture. In order to address the endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate (NTR – one minus
the marginal tax rate) we construct predicted NTRs, based on adjusted income
under pre- and post-reform tax laws before any response is taken into account.
We use a slightly modiﬁed version of the Slutsky decomposition for taxable in-
come that Gruber/Saez (2002) introduced in their study to identify income and
compensated substitution eﬀects separately.
The following section outlines the theoretical model our study is based on.
The main items of the tax reform are presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces
the data base and gives some information on the composition und development of
income for the period under investigation. Section 5 illustrates the econometric
approach and presents the estimation results as well as several robustness checks.
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The theoretical model we use is basically similar to the one Gruber/Saez (2002)
introduce in their study, except that we distinguish between gross and taxable
income and deﬁne the income eﬀect in a slightly diﬀerent manner. The basic
consumption-income model in a progressive income tax system is
C = Y   T(TI) = (1   )TI + R: (1)
where Y is gross income, TI is taxable income, T is tax liability,  is the
marginal tax rate, (1   ) is the net-of-tax rate (NTR) and R is virtual income.
Taxable income TI is deﬁned as gross income minus tax-deductible consumption.
Virtual income R reﬂects the diﬀerence between the tax amount that would result
from applying the marginal tax rate to taxable income and the actual tax amount,
TI   T, as well as the diﬀerence between gross and taxable income, Y   TI.
From eq. (1) it can be seen that a tax change aﬀects both the NTR and virtual
income, so a taxpayer’s reaction of taxable income TI(1 ;R) is given by a change








A change in the NTR aﬀects the relative prices of tax-privileged and non-
privileged consumption, and a change in virtual income aﬀects the taxpayer’s
budget, thus the tax change causes substitution as well as income eﬀects. Using











with @TIc=@(1   ) capturing the substitution eﬀect resulting from a change
in the marginal tax rate and TI @TI=@R capturing the income eﬀect of a change
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(4)
where c = @TI=@(1 ) (1 )=TI is the substitution (or compensated price)
elasticity and the income eﬀect parameter  = @TI=@R R=TI is deﬁned as an
elasticity as well, while Gruber/Saez (2002) deﬁne  = (1   ) @TI=@R. They
approximate TI(1   ) with TI   T in their estimations and then logarithmize
the income eﬀect term to obtain an elasticity parameter. This approximation is
certainly not problematic in the context of a bracket system like in the United
States where marginal tax rates are constant for relatively wide income ranges. In
Germany tax progression is more pronounced with marginal tax rates increasing
linearly in income. The latter leads to a larger diﬀerence between TI(1   ) and
TI   T except for the very top incomes. Therefore we use the income eﬀect
deﬁnition from Eq. 4 and turn it into computable quantities (see Section 5).
3However, the marginal tax rate is a function of taxable income and thus en-
dogenously determined by the taxpayer. In order to analyze behavioral eﬀects and
income adjustments induced by the income tax an external variation in the tax
rate is required. Here, the standard approach in the literature is to treat a tax
reform as a kind of quasi-natural experiment. In our case, the German income tax
reform 2000 provides this exogenous variation. A short outline of the key elements
of the reform is presented in the following section.
3 The German tax reform 2000
One of the main purposes of the reform which took place in Germany during the
years 2001-2005 was to stimulate economic growth and employment. To achieve
this goal the personal income tax schedule was phased down in three consecutive
steps – 2001, 2004, and 2005. Various measures were also taken that altered the
deﬁnition of the tax base. Additionally the corporate income tax was reduced and
several tax reliefs for local businesses were introduced.
In the reform steps preceding the period of our study marginal tax rates at
the bottom were changed from 25.9 to 23.9 % in 1999 and successively reduced to
19.9 % in 2001. At the top of the tax schedule rates were lowered from 53 to 48.5 %
between 1999 and 2001. Various subsequent reform measures were implemented
during the period 2001-2004, for which income tax panel data are now available.
The basic tax allowance was slightly increased during this period from 7206e to
7664e.1 The tax rate at the bottom of the tax schedule was reduced further from
19.9 % to 16 %. At the top the rate was cut from 48.5 % to 45 % for taxable incomes
exceeding 52152e, compared to 54999e in 2001. Tax rates in the medium range
of the schedule were also lowered, as depicted in Figure 1.2 Taxpayers with a high
taxable income and those with a taxable income slightly exceeding the basic tax
allowance experienced the largest tax rate cuts.
1The German income tax schedule 2001 was still stated in DM amounts. For a comparison
of the pre- and post-reform schedules we converted the values to e using the exchange rate 1e
= 1.95583 DM.
2The tax schedules 2002 and 2003 are the same as in 2001, except for the basic allowance
which was slightly increased to 7235e in 2002 and 2003, and are therefore not depicted here.


























Marginal Tax Rates 2001
Marginal Tax Rates 2004
Beside the changes in the tax schedule several other reform measures were
taken which altered the deﬁnition of the tax base. In order to support families,
annual child allowances were raised from 2556e to 2904e per child. Loss oﬀsetting
restrictions (for single taxpayers as well as between spouses) that were in place until
2003 were cancelled in 2004, and another rather drastic step was implemented when
from 2002 on only 50 % of certain capital gains (mainly dividends) entered the
tax base. On the other hand, some measures broadened the tax base, for example
allowable expenses for non-itemizing employees were cut from 1044e to 920e,
allowances for single parents were cut from 2871e to 1308e, and capital gains
exemption was reduced from 1550e to 1370e. But all in all, it was not the kind
of reform which lowered tax rates and broadened the tax base like many other
reforms since the 1980s, and it was not supposed to be revenue-neutral. On the
whole the vast majority of taxpayers experienced a perceptible tax relief.
54 Data
The data source we use is the German Taxpayer Panel, a large panel data set of
individual income tax returns that is now available for researchers via the German
Federal Statistical Oﬃce. The cross section data which are linked to a panel by
individual tax numbers include the whole population of German taxpayers. The
tax number may change, e. g. when a taxpayer moves to another German state or
when a couple gets married and opts for joint ﬁling since one of them will give up
her tax number (or, in case of a divorce, get a new one). Although the Statistical
Oﬃce tries to identify and link these cases via their socio-economic characteristics,
it is not possible to follow up all taxpayers consistently over time. Still the balanced
panel includes around 19 million taxpayers for the years 2001-2004. It contains
detailed information on various types of income, deductions and allowances, for
employees as well as for entrepreneurs, but also on capital income or income from
rent and lease. Demographic information on the taxpayers however is scarcely
provided.
Since the aim of our analysis is to identify income changes which are directly
attributable to reform incentives, we only analyze taxpayers who are subject to
taxation in each year in order to exclude cases with discontinuous working bio-
graphies. Furthermore we eliminate cases from the data whose socio-economic
characteristics change signiﬁcantly during the regarded period. More precisely
taxpayers are excluded
• whose marital status changes
• who are under age 25 in 2001
• who have their ﬁrst child,
• who retire during the regarded period
• who receive for the ﬁrst time an allowance for single parents or for disabled
persons and
• whose taxable income does not exceed the basic allowance.
6After these adjustments 12242397 cases remain in the data set. Our exclusion
strategy is rather restrictive, but it helps to eliminate income volatility which is
not related to tax incentives.
Since we drop mainly cases with lower incomes like ﬁrst-time mothers, trainees,
pensioners etc. mean values are higher in the subpanel than in the original panel.
In most years taxable income exceeds 40000e, the mean income tax amount is
around 9500e (see Table 5). Wage income is highest on average and most equally
distributed since it is hardly negative, in contrast to other income types. The large
standard deviations of business and capital income however show how much the
level of these income types varies between taxpayers.
Many of the average income values decline in 2002 before increasing again
slightly in 2003 and more sharply in 2004, with two exceptions, capital income
and income from rent and lease. Unlike most income types, average capital income
falls down to 60 % in 2002, due to the aforementioned reform measure concern-
ing dividends, and keeps dropping until 2004. Mean income from rent and lease
strikingly changes its sign from negative to positive. There is little doubt on the
assumption that this development is for the most part not attributable to the tax
reform analyzed here but rather a consequence of a change in deduction rules pre-
ceding this reform: After the German reuniﬁcation acquisition and modernization
of real estate in the former GDR was highly privileged. Large investments were
made during the post-reuniﬁcation years, peaking in 1998 when important deduc-
tion possibilities expired. Investments taken in 1998 could be depreciated at once
or in arbitrary amounts during the next four years, so in 2002/2003 depreciation
was mostly completed and balances switched from negative to positive. We try to
control for this development in our estimations.
Figure 2 sheds some light on the composition of income in 2001. More than
90 % of the taxpayers included in the panel are wage earners, and wages add up
to over 80 % of overall gross income. On the contrary, a quarter of the taxpayers
declare capital income, which results only in 3.7 % of total income. Unsurprisingly
income composition changes in the top percentile which is dominated by taxpayers
with business income. The share of wage income falls to 30 % (see Figure 3).
While overall income composition remains relatively stable in the years 2001-2004
7(see Table 6), changes over time are more sizeable at the top 1 %. The much
more obvious decline in capital income from 2002 on emphasizes that especially
taxpayers at the top of the distribution have disproportionately high income from
dividends and beneﬁt most from this reform measure.
The distribution of gross income broadens between 2001 and 2004. Table 7
shows a movement from bottom to top when 2001 decile classiﬁcation is used in
every year: The share of taxpayers increases in the upper deciles and declines
in the lower deciles over time, by amounts that exceed the usual shifts due to
nominal income growth. This shift in income distribution may be partly driven by
a diﬀerent nominal development between wages and pensions on the one hand and
business and self-employment income on the other hand in the years 2001 to 2004.
While nominal wages and pensions remained almost constant aggregate nominal
business and self-employment income increased by more than 12 %. The latter
are furthermore concentrated in the upper income percentiles, whereas wages and
pensions are the dominating income types in the lower percentiles. We account for
these diﬀerences by inﬂating the diﬀerent income types in the data set with their
respective growth rates.
5 Empirical strategy
In the following our empirical approach and the results are presented. We esti-
mate the elasticity of taxable income by 2SLS which is the common approach in
the literature.3 The general equation for our estimations is based on the Slutsky
decomposition derived in Section 2. To approximate the growth rate of taxable
income with respect to a percentage change in the NTR we use a log-log speciﬁca-
tion. The income eﬀect term of Eq. 4 is rewritten in terms that can be calculated
directly from the data. For the change in taxable income between base year t   p
(with p  1) and reform year t we get the following equation:
3Holmlund/Söderström (2008) make an interesting suggestion and use a dynamic panel es-
timator to account for some econometric issues arising from the traditional methodology. This
approach is not followed in this paper, but will be a subject of future work. The econometric
shortcomings of the current methodology are brieﬂy addressed subsequent to this section.
8ln TIit =  + 
cln (1   it) + 
 Tit
(Yit p   TIit p) + (it pTIit p   Tit p)
+ uit
(5)
with ln TIit = ln TIit  ln TIit p, ln(1 it) = ln (1 it) ln (1 it p)
and so on. c is the compensated (substitution) elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the NTR, and  is income elasticity. The income eﬀect corresponds
to the negative change in the tax amount (which is equal to the change in after-
tax income) relative to base year virtual income. For the dependent variable, the
change in taxable income, we adjust inﬂated base year income for other changes
in the tax code that were part of the reform (e. g. concerning expenses and al-
lowances), taking the 2004 deﬁnition as a benchmark. We thus create a taxable
base which is consistent over time by eliminating income changes that are not di-
rectly attributable to the reform but due to diﬀerences in deduction possibilities.
We address the endogeneity problem of the marginal tax rate by calculating
synthetic (or predicted) marginal tax rates ~ t p and ~ t, applying the pre- and the
post-reform tax code to inﬂated base year income ~ TIt p. With (1 ~ t p) we obtain
the NTR the taxpayer would face in 2004 if tax law and her real income did not
change over time. (1   ~ t) is the NTR on constant real base year income, under
post-reform tax law, but before any behavioral response. The diﬀerence between
these two NTRs serves as an instrument variable for the truly observed diﬀerence
between the NTRs.4 Including log base year income ln TIt p to control for mean
reversion and adding a vector of base year covariates Xit p yields our estimation
equation
ln TIit =  + 
c ln (1   it) + 
 Tit
(Yit p   TIit p) + (it pTIit p   Tit p)
+ ln TIit p + ’Xit p + uit
(6)
4The endogeneity problem analogously applies to the tax amount Tit which is needed to
calculate the income eﬀect term. We therefore calculate a synthetic tax liability ~ Tit that the
taxpayer would face under post-reform law, but with constant real base year income. The
observed income eﬀect is then instrumented with the synthetic one, exchanging Tit with ~ Tit.
9This speciﬁcation basically corresponds to the approach used in most stud-
ies, except for the income eﬀect which is seldom included. A control variable for
mean reversion eﬀects has been used in almost every speciﬁcation since Auten/
Carroll (1999). Some studies include more sophisticated controls like 10-piece
splines in base year income to control more accurately for mean reversion and
exogenous income trends (e. g. Gruber/Saez (2002), Giertz (2007)). In case of
strong correlation between the change in marginal tax rates and the level of tax-
able income such detailed income controls may destroy identiﬁcation of the true
response, especially when using only two years of data. Since in our case tax rate
changes are not limited to a certain range of incomes or monotonically increasing
in income as in other studies, we additionally use a 10-piece splines speciﬁcation
in order to test the sensitivity of our results (see column (2) in Table 1).
The vector X includes number of children, age (and age squared) and dummy
variables controlling for the main income type (wages or income from business/self-
employment) and for joint ﬁling in order to address the fact that joint ﬁlers are
treated diﬀerently from single ﬁlers. The number of children as well as age and
age squared serve as proxy variables for life-cycle eﬀects.
In a third speciﬁcation another dummy is added which indicates whether a
taxpayer declares rent and lease income in every year to control for the development
in rent and lease income noted in Section 4. The dummy enters the estimation
equation directly and interacted with the NTR elasticity. By adding a dummy for
taxpayers declaring rent and lease income in every year and additionally interacting
this dummy with the change in NTR we get the general positive eﬀect of the rent
and lease trend on income growth as well as the marginal NTR eﬀect for taxpayers
declaring this income type. Since the interaction term is also endogenous, it is
instrumented analogously to the NTR elasticity.
Although the three-year diﬀerence between 2001 and 2004 would include the
whole range of data available we use the diﬀerence between 2002 and 2004 in
the main speciﬁcation of our estimations for diﬀerent reasons. First, the reform
measures from 2001 to 2004 were embedded in a greater reform program starting
in 1999 and ending in 2005. In 2001 tax rates had been lowered from 22.9 % to
19.9 % at the bottom and from 51 % to 48.5 % at the top, so observed income in
102001 might already reﬂect a certain degree of behavioral response. Second, from
2002 on only 50 % of certain types of capital income (primarily dividends) entered
the tax base, which, as shown in Figure 3, had a huge impact on the level of
declared capital income of high income taxpayers. Since the data do not contain
detailed information on the composition of capital income, it is rather diﬃcult to
create a consistent deﬁnition of 2001 taxable income over time. Third, the one-
year diﬀerence between 2004 and 2003 might include anticipation eﬀects since the
tax rate cut in 2004 was known in advance. Therefore we opt for the two-year
diﬀerence (p = 2) and use the one-year diﬀerence (p = 1) for robustness checks.
Results
The basic results of the 2SLS regressions are presented in Table 1.5 11369226
observations could be used in the estimations. Column (1) shows the results from
the basic speciﬁcation with the log in 2002 taxable income as a control variable.
In this case the overall NTR elasticity is 0.937. The income eﬀect is not only
insigniﬁcant but also practically zero. The other demographic control variables
are all signiﬁcant, but rather small in value. Joint ﬁlers realize a slightly higher
income growth than single ﬁlers. The negative sign of the self-employed dummy is
surprising since taxpayers with income from business and self-employment usually
have more possibilities to rearrange components of their income than employees.
Interpreting age as a life-cycle proxy, the negative sign implies that income is more
stable when taxpayers get older. To a certain degree the number of (tax relevant)
children is correlated with taxpayers’ age and thus reﬂects life-cycle eﬀects as well.
An NTR elasticity of 0.94 is relatively high compared to the results in recent
work which mainly range from 0.2 to 0.6. An interesting point is made by Slemrod/
Kopczuk (2002) who argue that taxable income elasticity is not a ﬁxed parameter
but depends on the deduction possibilities deﬁned by tax law and thus can to some
extent be controlled by policy makers. Since German income tax law oﬀers various
possibilities to narrow the tax base along the whole income distribution, it seems
possible that behavioral response is more pronounced than in other countries.
5The F statistics for the NTR instrument and the income eﬀect instrument (and in spec-
iﬁcation (3) also for the interaction term instrument) in the ﬁrst stage are very high, so the
instruments can be considered strong.
11Table 1: Basic estimation results
(1) (2) (3)
Basic 10-piece Rent/Lease
Variable speciﬁcation splines controls
NTR elasticity (c) 0:937 0:435 0:555
(0:006) (0:005) (0:008)
c  Rent/Lease – – 1:22
(0:014)
Income elasticity () < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
(0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0001)
Joint ﬁling 0:024 0:018 0:027
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Number of children 0:018 0:009 0:018
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Age  0:004  0:003  0:004
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Age squared < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Self-employed  0:052  0:059  0:062
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Rent/Lease – – 0:028
(0:000)
ln(income)  0:164 –  0:175
(0:0001) (0:000) (0:0001)
10-piece splines(income) – yes –
Constant 1:878 4:318 1:997
(0:002) (0:009) (0:002)
Observations 11369226
Note: Estimates based on the years 2002 and 2004. Standard errors in
parentheses. // denote signiﬁcance on the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level.
Instrument variables are created as described in the text. Coeﬃcients on
10-piece splines range from -0.427 (1st decile) to 0.012 (9th decile).
12Another explanation which is more related to the estimation strategy is that
most studies use more sophisticated income controls in their estimations. Therefore
we enter 10-piece splines in log base year income in the estimation equation instead
of simply log base year income to see how much this inﬂuences our results (column
(2)). The elasticity falls by more than 50 % to 0.435, indicating that such detailed
income controls capture a considerable part of the NTR elasticity, especially when
using only two years of data. Interestingly the income eﬀect is now signiﬁcant at
a 5 % level, although economically negligible.
Another factor that obviously drives the results is the striking development of
rent and lease income. Assuming that this trend is for the most part not directly
related to the analyzed tax reform it needs to be controlled for. We do this by
adding a dummy and an interaction term as described in section 5. The results
are shown in column (3). The NTR elasticity falls to 0.56, whereas the interaction
term parameter exceeds one (1.22), both being highly signiﬁcant. The rent and
lease dummy itself is signiﬁcant, but small in value. Income eﬀects are again
insigniﬁcant.
These ﬁgures indicate that, holding all other factors constant, taxpayers with
rent and lease income have experienced a higher income growth between 2002 and
2004 than those who did not declare this income type, in general as well as with
respect to changes in the NTR. The development of rent and lease income is a good
example of how results are driven by changes in the income distribution and not
mainly by increases in the top income range where, as we can see in Figure 3, even
in 2004 the share of rent and lease income does not exceed 2 % of total income.
Many taxpayers move upwards along the income distribution because rent and
lease losses cease to reduce their total income and not because they increase their
economic income in response to a tax rate cut. This is why decile-based splines
have such a high explanatory power for income growth, even when, as in our case,
tax rate changes are not directly related to the level of income.
13Robustness checks
In order to test how sensitive the results are to our base year choice we use a one-
year diﬀerence with 2003 as base year. The results are displayed in column (1) of
Table 2. The elasticity falls by almost 20 % from 0.937 to 0.759. This reﬂects the
observed income growth between 2002 and 2003 which can be considered unrelated
to reform incentives: Starting from a higher level in 2003 but under the same pre-
reform law, NTR eﬀects on income growth become smaller. When rent and lease
controls are included, the elasticity falls to 0.506, the interaction term is 0.894
(column (2)), which is again lower than the results of the two-year diﬀerence. In
both speciﬁcations, the income eﬀect is now signiﬁcant, but still very small.
Even though we try to control for mean reversion and to capture exogenous
trends, there may still be many unobserved factors that determine individual in-
come growth over time, leading to very large results which are wrongly attributed
to tax incentives. Therefore we divided taxpayers by three main income sources
(business, self-employed and dependent), sorted them by the magnitude of their
relative income change between 2002 and 2004 and cut oﬀ successively 1 %, 2,5 %
and 5 % at both tails of this distribution, i. e. those taxpayers with the largest
negative and positive income diﬀerences per group. The division by income source
serves the purpose to maintain a similar population structure after dropping the
extreme values. The results for the 1 % and 2,5 % thresholds are displayed in
columns (3)/(4) and (5)/(6) of Table 2.6 The NTR elasticity is already rather
sensitive to the 1 % cutoﬀ, falling to 0.691 and even to 0.522 with rent and lease
controls. This trend continues when cutting oﬀ 2,5 % at the edges, falling to 0.451
and 0.347, respectively. In fact the overall elasticity seems to be driven by a small
number of taxpayers. The more extreme values are cut oﬀ, the more the impact of
the interaction term decreases, indicating that taxpayers with the largest income
changes are also those with income from rent and lease. Although the largest in-
come diﬀerences may partly contain true behavioral response, at least the results
when using a 1 % threshold seem to be mostly reliable.
6For the sake of clarity the results of the 5 % cutoﬀ are not displayed, but they continue the
observed decline in values (0.286 and 0.235 resp., with an interaction term of 0.146).
14Table 2: Robustness checks
One-year diﬀerence Cut-oﬀ in income change
(2004/2003) 1% pos./neg. 2,5% pos./neg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NTR elasticity 0:759 0:506 0:691 0:522 0:451 0:347
(0:002) (0:006) (0:003) (0:004) (0:000) (0:000)
c  Rent/Lease – 0:894 – 0:521 – 0:315
(0:011) (0:008) (0:000)
Income elasticity 0:0001 0:0001 < 0:001 < 0:001 0:000 0:000
(< 0:0001) (< 0:0001) (0:0002) (0:0002) (0:000) (0:000)
Observations 11369226 10931959 10597308
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. // denote signiﬁcance on the 1 %, 5 %
and 10 % level respectively. Cutoﬀ thresholds denote the 1 %/2,5 % of the taxpayers
with the largest negative and the 1 %/2,5 % with the largest positive income changes
over time, respectively.
Thirdly we follow an interesting approach employed by Giertz (2008) (and also
already used as a robustness check by Auten/Carroll (1999)) and invert the panel,
i. e. we use 2004 as base year and simulate the eﬀects of a tax rate increase from
2004 to 2002. The idea is that the results should be close to the original value if no
mean reversion is present: If the response is positive and taxpayers react with an
income increase to a tax rate decline, then it should be true that they reduce their
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+ ’X04 + u (7)
with X04 including ln TI04. The NTR instrument is calculated analogously
to the original analysis by applying both 2004 and 2002 tax law to 2004 taxable
income and taking the diﬀerence. The same applies to the interaction term. The
income values used for the dependent variable are again based on a consistent 2004
tax law deﬁtinion. The results are displayed in Table 3.




NTR elasticity  0:499  0:222 0:438
(0:006) (0:006) (0:007)
c  Rent/Lease –  1:251 –
(0:012)
Income elasticity  0:0001  0:0001  0:0002
(< 0:0001) (< 0:0001) (< 0:0001)
Observations 11369226
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. // denote
signiﬁcance on the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively.
The results in the basic speciﬁcation and with rent and lease controls are neg-
ative, meaning that the reaction of taxpayers increasing their income after the
tax rate increase overweighs the reaction of those who reduce their income. This
indicates that some kind of severe mean reversion is present, although the eﬀect is
not as clear as it is in Giertz (2008) or Auten/Carroll (1999)). Since the 2004 tax
rate cuts did not only aﬀect high incomes but all taxpayers, eﬀects of movements
in both directions along the income distribution may partly cancel out each other.
An explanation for the negative results could be that there are in fact taxpayers
with lower incomes who show a negative response to the tax rate cuts (see Table 4),
which turns into an income increase in the inverted panel. In the inverted case
however the relative changes increase in value due to the lower starting level of
income. This rather technical eﬀect may be one reason for the negative results, but
there is evidence that the results are inﬂuenced by other eﬀects not fully controlled
for. When 10-piece splines are included the elasticity switches from a negative to
a positive value of 0.438, which is almost exactly the same result as in the original
analysis that included splines (0.435). These results conﬁrm the evidence found
in other studies that non-linear income controls are obviously better suited to ac-
16count for mean reversion eﬀects. But again, as we have only very few years of data
available, detailed controls tend to capture a great deal of the NTR elasticity.
Results by income type and income group
The magnitude of the NTR elasticity varies strongly when we look at the results
per income group and income type. We divide taxpayers by their dominating
income type in combination with their level of taxable income, taking an arbitrary
threshold of 50000e. We keep the income type classiﬁcation we used for the cutoﬀ
of extreme values (business, self-employed and dependent). Since the 1 % cutoﬀ
rule seems to produce the most plausible results without taking the risk of losing
too much of the true response, we continue with the subpopulation of 10931959
observations. The results are displayed in Table 4.
Taxpayers with high dependent income show the strongest response, whereas
the elasticity of wage earners with taxable incomes below 50000e is close to zero.
Surprisingly, within the group of self-employed, those with lower incomes react
stronger than high income taxpayers, which is also true for the interaction term.
The elasticity of taxpayers with business income in the lower income range even
has a negative sign, meaning that these taxpayers reduce their income in spite of
the NTR increase, and there is no compensation by a positive income eﬀect, which
is insigniﬁcant. Interestingly, the interaction term is positive and very strong,
indicating that a drop in income in this group is only true for those cases without
rent and lease income. The opposite holds for taxpayers with high dependent
income, where the interaction term is negative.
The most interesting thing about the group speciﬁc results is that now the
income eﬀect becomes highly signiﬁcant for some subgroups. For self-employed in
the lower income range the income eﬀect is positive, meaning that in addition to
the positive NTR eﬀects, for these taxpayers the reduced tax burden is an incentive
to further increase their income. For taxpayers with primarily dependent income,
income eﬀects are negative, in the lower range even with a value of -0.64, resulting
in an overall negative response for this group as well.
17Table 4: Results for diﬀerent groups
Business Self-employed Dependent
 50000 > 50000  50000 > 50000  50000 > 50000
c  0:109 0:383 0:538 0:249 0:015 1:479
(0:030) (0:034) (0:083) (0:036) (0:005) (0:021)
c  R/L 0:408 0:563 0:323 0:175 0:024  0:243
(0:070) (0:038) (0:188) (0:043) (0:016) (0:024)
  0:0006  0:0004 0:166  0:0001  0:639  0:014
(0:0004) (0:0003) (0:043) (0:0004) (0:008) (0:002)
Observations 1031059 508970 326413 315692 7220900 1528925
Note: Estimates based on the years 2002 and 2004. Standard errors in parentheses.
// denote signiﬁcance on the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively.
6 Summary and conclusions
This paper contributes to the body of literature on the elasticity of taxable income
and provides new results for Germany which add to the scarce empirical evidence
for European countries so far. When we control for the striking rent and lease
income growth, we ﬁnd an overall elasticity of 0.56, assuming that the rent and
lease income development is mostly independent from the tax reform under obser-
vation. The results are rather sensitive to robustness checks, e. g. the inclusion of
splines, the choice of base year and the exclusion of extreme income diﬀerences,
ranging altogether from 0.35 to 0.76.
A part of the large response of taxpayers with rent and lease income might
also be related to the reform, whereas the results including splines as controls
tend to underestimate the true value. Taking the possibility into account that
large diﬀerences which are cut oﬀ partly contain real response, an overall elasticity
of approximately 0.6 seems realistic and reliable. Income eﬀects are insigniﬁcant
or economically negligible throughout the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, which implies
that there is practically no diﬀerence between compensated and uncompensated
18elasticity. All in all the results are considerably higher than the rather moderate
labor supply elasticities (see e. g. Wagenhals (2000)) and shed a new light on the
eﬃciency cost of taxation in Germany as well as on predicting revenue eﬀects of
future reforms.
Some econometric issues of the methodology are to be mentioned, which so far
only Holmlund/Söderström (2008) deal with in their study. Using base year income
for creating instrumental variables is somewhat problematic since it is probably
correlated with the error term and therefore endogenous. Holmlund/Söderström
(2008) use a dynamic panel estimator to solve the endogeneity problem which
seems a promising step to a further improvement of the estimation methodology
and will be considered in upcoming work.
In the context of previous work, the range of our results conﬁrms that it is
essential to control accurately for exogenous income trends and mean reversion
to obtain a response that is directly related to an NTR change. This seems to
be a problem in all studies so far. Furthermore, the inclusion of splines reveals
how diﬃcult it is to compare NTR elasticities when diﬀerent income controls are
used. With improving data availability and longer time periods the eﬀects of more
than one tax reform can be analyzed simultaneously and changes in the income
distribution can be controlled for in a more accurate way, as already done by
Gruber/Saez (2002), Giertz (2007) or Heim (2009). The time dimension of our
panel is still too short at the moment, but more years of data will allow a better
control for the development of incomes in years with and without tax reforms
under diﬀerent economic conditions.
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21Appendix: Summary statistics
Table 5: Summary statistics of income and tax variables (in e)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Income type Mean Std.-dev. Mean Std.-dev. Mean Std.-dev. Mean Std.-dev.
Agriculture 15388 35699 14354 37517 14046 34276 15415 36814
Business 27378 285900 24806 291541 24821 355119 27786 433339
Self-employed 39785 87185 39817 92210 39677 89672 42419 93320
Wages 40842 39755 41492 37044 42103 34174 43079 36325
Capital 12203 153878 7623 65820 7012 55151 6511 65273
Rent and Lease -537 29419 -329 32400 83 31414 1004 29826
Pensions 4700 37973 4834 32966 5005 22666 5041 24172
Taxable income 40500 130703 39732 121444 40346 144182 42380 172567
Income Tax 9538 63451 9362 59172 9562 70639 9425 78418
Note: Calculations based on 12242397 observations and on annual nominal values.
Table 6: Share of income and taxpayers by income type 2001-2004
2001 2002 2003 2004
Income type e n e n e n e n
Agriculture 0.75 2.42 0.71 2.44 0.69 2.47 0.75 2.49
Business 8.01 14.65 7.44 14.89 7.59 15.37 8.36 15.58
Self-employed 5.84 7.35 5.94 7.41 5.94 7.53 6.18 7.54
Wages 81.00 92.93 82.66 92.58 82.58 92.44 81.18 92.24
Capital 3.69 24.18 2.43 23.13 2.17 22.86 2.13 24.56
Rent and Lease -0.24 21.92 -0.15 22.24 0.04 22.66 0.44 22.74
Pensions 0.95 9.86 0.98 9.77 0.99 9.72 0.96 9.58
Note: Calculations based on 12242397 observations and on annual nominal values.





















































































































































24Table 7: Changes in taxpayer distribution by income deciles 2001
Decile Change of taxpayers (in %)
2001 02/01 03/02 04/03 04/01
1 +5.16 -0.96 -6.37 -2.48
2 -7.96 -4.85 +2.06 -10.63
3 -4.47 -3.99 -1.60 -9.76
4 -2.19 -1.53 -0.51 -4.18
5 -0.49 -0.39 +0.09 -0.78
6 +0.21 +0.10 -1.11 -0.81
7 +0.74 +0.27 -0.74 +0.27
8 +2.08 +1.18 -0.13 +3.15
9 +3.94 +3.77 +1.56 +9.54
10 +2.97 +5.52 +6.47 +15.68
Note: Calculations based on 12242397
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